Avner Cohen (born ) is a writer, historian, and professor, and is well known for his works His seminal work, Israel and the Bomb, which chronicled the Israeli nuclear program, was published in This book led him to encounter. Until now, there has been no detailed account of Israel’snuclear history. Previous treatments of the Israel and the Bomb. Avner Cohen. Copyright Date: Israel and the Bomb has 57 ratings and 4 reviews. Nick said: I, like, forgot how to read over the past few months. Back on the wagon, huzzah! A poor choi.
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Erin rated it it was amazing Jan 03, We do not want the Arab Nazis to come and slaughter us.
Israel and the Bomb by Avner Cohen
These make the difference between a leader’s vision and a credible nuclear-weapon project. He studied physical chemistry at University College in London, receiving his doctorate in Pratt had three university degrees and a finely developed aesthetic sense, which stood in incongruous contrast to his tough, no-nonsense approach to work. The intelligence information was passed by the Soviets, according to the news magazine, to Cairo and this, Time claimed, resulted in Egyptian forces interrupting its military advance.
Pratt’s insistence that he should report only to Peres and Ben Gurion, Peres’s own divide-and-rule style of management, and security considerations created from the start a fragmented project.
A nuclear deterrent so secret that the enemy does cohdn suspect it, loses its deterrent capability. From the late s Bergmann and others saw France as Israel’s best hope for nuclear assistance. Israel’s geopolitical circumstances were central to Cohdn Gurion’s strategic pessimism.
Saad Abbasi rated it really liked it Dec 04, Without the Holocaust we cannot understand either the depth of Ben Gurion’s commitment to acquiring nuclear weapons or his inhibitions about nuclear-weapon policy.
Ernst David Bergmann and Shimon Peres. In addition to Bergmann there was another individual who contributed much to decision-making at the time, and this was Shimon Peres. Much of the credit for building the Dimona complex belongs to Pratt. Ned Moran rated it liked it May 13, There is one thing, however, in which we are not inferior to any other people in the world–this is anf Jewish brain.
Avner Cohen’s last gasp?
His role diminished further as Israel’s nuclear project began to take shape. Bergmann was drawn to Ben Gurion in the late s because of Ben Gurion’s conviction that Israel’s future depended on harnessing science and technology. Ben Gurion trusted me.
Peres was also instrumental in selecting the project’s scientists and managers. His autocratic conduct within the IAEC, however, drove its physicists to the Weizmann Institute, and they soon formed the main opposition to his plans. I am confident that science is able to provide us with the weapon that will secure the peace, and deter our enemies. We don’t want to reach again the situation that you were in. Moreover, until a weapon has been tested — non-conventional or conventional — it fails to be a deterrent.
Thus the technical methods that Dostrovsky and his colleagues developed in the early s in the areas of isotope separation and uranium extraction were claimed by both the Weizmann Institute and the IAEC as their own inventions. And the Jewish brain does not disappoint; Jewish science does not disappoint. He weaves together the story of the formative years of Israel’s nuclear program, from the founding of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission into the alliance with France that gave Israel the sophisticated technology Cohen focuses on a two-decade period from about -during which David Ben-Gurion’s vision of making Israel a nuclear-weapon state was realized.
In terms of his leadership style and management approach, however, Pratt was the closest Israeli replica of Groves. In his correspondence with President John F. It was difficult at times to distinguish Dostrovsky’s involvement in science from his involvement in defense projects. Israel did not organize its nuclear project as a single military entity, as the United States did during the Manhattan Project, so there was no Israeli equivalent to General Leslie Groves, commander of the Manhattan Project.
Avner Cohen’s last gasp? | Yoel Cohen | The Blogs
Bergmann avnfr scientific exchanges between the French atomic energy commission CEA and the IAEC, but in it became clear that without a political breakthrough, these friendly relations would fall short of Israel’s needs. The main point is to explain how Israel bomh its pursuit of nuclear deterrence in the face of tremendous American pressure not do so. The Manhattan Project needed as many of the best physicists to prove that a nuclear bomb could be developed, a fact on which subsequent nuclear programs were able to build.
In the eyes of these senior officers, Peres’s lack of military experience undermined his credibility on national security issues. The bo,b would have to come from another place. View all 4 comments. The Chief of Staff is on the job for three, four, years.
MillerCalvin Shipbaugh No preview wnd – Taylor Smith rated it really liked it Jul 15, Anas rated it it was ok Oct 26, Cohen reveals that Israel crossed the nuclear weapons threshold on the eve of the Six-Day War, yet it remains ambiguous about its nuclear capability to this iwrael.
The report itself generated less attention than Cohen may have hoped for — both inside Israel, where it was lost in the deluge of most celebratory media reportage on fifty years of the Six Day War, and among the foreign media which, with the exception of the original NYT report, ignored it.
Israel and the Bomb
OTHERS The success avneg a scientific-technological project of the magnitude of the Israeli nuclear project cannot by explained by appealing to the “great men” theory of history. Peres’s boundless energy and political skills became the necessary ingredient in realizing Israel’s nuclear hopes. The only solution to Israel’s security problem was a robust deterrent force.
Israel’s nuclear project was conceived in the shadow of the Holocaust, and the lessons of the Holocaust provided the justification and motivation for the project.